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ÁLVAREZ MOZOS, MIKEL |
Departamento: |
Universidade: | Universitat de Barcelona |
Teléfono: |
Correo electrónico: | Este enderezo de correo está a ser protexido dos robots de correo lixo. Precisa activar o JavaScript para velo. |
Páxina persoal: | http://eamo.usc.es/pub/mikel/ |
PUBLICACIÓNS
Atopáronse 20 rexistros.
1) Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Álvarez-Mozos, M.; Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G. and Jiménez-Losada, A. (2022). On convexity in cooperative games with externalities Economic Theory Vol. 74, pp. 265–292 |
2) Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Álvarez-Mozos, M.; Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G. and Jiménez-Losada, A. (2021). Marginality and convexity and partition function form games Mathematical Methods of Operations Research Vol. 94, pp. 1-23 |
3) Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Álvarez-Mozos, M.; Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G. and Jiménez-Losada, A. (2019). Complete null agent for games with externalities Expert Systems with Applications Vol. 135, pp. 1-11 |
4) Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Álvarez-Mozos, M.; Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G. and Jiménez-Losada, A. (2017). Some structural properties of a lattice of embedded coalitions International Journal of General Systems Vol. 46, pp. 46 (2), 123-143 |
5) Álvarez-Mozos, M.; Alonso-Meijide, J. M. and Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G. (2017). On the externality free Shapley Shubik index Games and Economic Behavior Vol. 105, pp. 148-154 |
6) Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Álvarez-Mozos, M. and Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G. (2017). Power indices and minimal winning coalitions for simple games in partition function form Group Decision and Negotiation Vol. 26, pp. 1231–1245 |
7) Albizuri and Álvarez-Mozos, M. (2016). The a-serial cost sharing rule Central European Journal of Operations Research Vol. 24, pp. 73-86 |
8) Tejada, O. and Álvarez-Mozos, M. (2016). Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multi-lateral assignment markets Review of Economic Design Vol. 20, pp. 289-327 |
9) Álvarez-Mozos, M.; Ferreira, F.; Alonso-Meijide, J. M. and Pinto, A. (2015). Characterizations of power indices based on null player free winning coalitions Optimization Vol. 64, pp. 675-686 |
10) Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Álvarez-Mozos, M. and Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G. (2015). The Least Square Nucleolus is a Normalized Banzhaf Value Optimization Letters Vol. 9, pp. 1393-1399 |
11) Álvarez-Mozos, M. and Tejada, O. (2015). The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 44, pp. 781-805 |
12) Álvarez-Mozos, M.; R. van den Brink; G. van der Laan and Tejada, O. (2013). Share functions for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation European Journal of Operational Research Vol. 224(1), pp. 167-179 |
13) Álvarez-Mozos, M.; Hellman, Z. and Winter, E. (2013). The Spectrum value for coalitional games Games and Economic Behavior Vol. 82, pp. 132-142 |
14) Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Álvarez-Mozos, M. and Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G. (2012). Notes on a comment on 2-efficiency and the Banzhaf value Applied Mathematics Letters Vol. 25, pp. 1098-1100 |
15) Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Ferreira, F.; Álvarez-Mozos, M. and Pinto, A. (2011). Two new power indices based on winning coalitions Journal of Difference Equations and Applications Vol. 17, pp. 1095-1100 |
16) Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Ferreira, F.; Álvarez-Mozos, M. and Pinto (2011). Power Indices applied to the Portuguese Parliament In: Dynamics, Games, and Science II (ISBN: 978-3-642-14787-6) (pp. 97-105). Springer |
17) Álvarez-Mozos, M. and Tejada, O. (2011). Parallel characterizations of a generalized Shapley value and a generalized Banzhaf value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation Decision Support Systems Vol. 52, pp. 21-27 |
18) Álvarez-Mozos, M. and Alonso-Meijide, J. M. (2010). Las elecciones generales de 2008 y el juego del parlamento Revista Suma Vol. 63, pp. 7-15 |
19) Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Álvarez-Mozos, M. and Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G. (2009). Values of games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions Mathematical Social Sciences Vol. 58, pp. 202-213 |
20) Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Álvarez-Mozos, M. and Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G. (2009). The Banzhaf value when some players are incompatible Homo Oeconomicus Vol. 26, pp. 403-415 |